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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the effect of heterogeneity of link weight, heterogene-
ity of the frequency or amount of interactions among individuals, on the evolu-
tion of cooperation. Based on an analysis of the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma
game on a weighted one-dimensional lattice network with intra-individual het-
erogeneity, we confirm that moderate level of link-weight heterogeneity can fa-
cilitate cooperation. Furthermore, we identify two key mechanisms by which
link-weight heterogeneity promotes the evolution of cooperation: mechanisms
for spread and maintenance of cooperation. We also derive the corresponding
conditions under which the mechanisms can work through evolutionary dynam-
ics.
Keywords: Evolution of cooperation, Prisoner’s dilemma, Heterogeneity of
link weight, One-dimensional lattice network, Game theory
1. Introduction
The evolution of cooperation, which plays a key role in natural and social
systems, has attracted much interest in diverse academic fields, including bi-
ology, sociology, and economics [1, 2]. The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is often
used to study the evolution of cooperation in a population consisting of selfish
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individuals [3, 4]. In the PD game, two individuals simultaneously decide to
cooperate or defect. A payoff matrix of the PD game is given in Table 1.
Cooperation Defection
Cooperation R, R S, T
Defection T , S P , P
Table 1: Payoff matrix for the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game. In this game, two individuals
decide simultaneously to cooperate or defect. Mutual cooperation provides them both with
a payoff R, whereas mutual defection results in a payoff P . If one individual cooperates and
the other defects, the former obtains a payoff T , and the latter a payoff S. These values are
assumed to satisfy the conditions T > R > P > S and 2R > S + T .
If either individual wishes to maximize his/her personal profit in this game,
he/she will choose to defect regardless of the opponent’s decision, despite mutual
cooperation being better than mutual defection for both individuals. According
to the evolutionary dynamics of the PD game where an individual is paired with
a randomly chosen opponent in a well-mixed population, cooperators become
extinct whereas defectors eventually dominate in the population [5].
However, in a dilemma situation in the real world, we often see that altruistic
behaviors exist among unrelated individuals. Nowak [6] proposed five rules as
the mechanisms enabling the evolution of altruism: kin selection [7], direct
reciprocity [4, 8], indirect reciprocity [9, 10], network reciprocity [11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19], and group selection [20].
In this study, we focus on network reciprocity, which is a mechanism pio-
neered by Nowak and May [11, 12] that enables the evolution of cooperation
when each individual is likely to interact repeatedly with a fixed subset of the
population only. In Nowak and May’s model, individuals are placed on nodes in
a two-dimensional lattice and play the PD game repeatedly with their directly
connected neighbors only. The authors show that the spatial constraint of in-
teractions among individuals in the lattice network can facilitate the evolution
of cooperation. Although Nowak and May’s model assumes that the popula-
tion has a simple network structure, that is, a two-dimensional lattice, it has
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recently been shown that many real-world networks are identified as complex
networks. Well-known examples of complex networks are the small-world net-
work [21] and the scale-free network [22], in which the number of links (degree)
that each individual has differs. Recently, it has been confirmed by Santos and
Pacheco [13] that heterogeneity of the number of links in complex networks can
enhance the evolution of cooperation. There have been following studies that
investigate the evolution of cooperation on networks with heterogeneous number
of links [14, 15]. This heterogeneity is also known to contribute to the efficiency
of collective action [23, 24]. Additionally, it has been shown that the mixing
pattern of link degree can affect the emergence of cooperation [16]. See [17, 18]
for detailed reviews of evolutionary and coevolutionary games on graphs. Also
see [19] for a thorough survey of the evolutionary dynamics of group interactions
on various types of structured populations.
The aforementioned studies, however, assume that individuals interact with
one another with the same frequency or amount; that is, all the link weights
between individuals in the society are identical. On the contrary, individu-
als in real-world networks, such as scientific collaboration networks, phone call
networks, email networks, and airport transportation networks, have heteroge-
neous intentions in their relationships [25, 26, 27]. There is substantial interest
among researchers in knowing how heterogeneity of the strength of relationships
(that is, link weight) among individuals influences human behavioral traits (e.g.
sociological studies such as [28, 29, 30]).
In particular, researchers have recently investigated whether the heterogene-
ity of link weight between individuals promotes the evolution of cooperation.
For example, Du et al. [31] constructed a simulation model in which individuals
are placed on a node in a scale-free network and connected to other individu-
als with heterogeneous link weights. In their model, individuals interact more
frequently with neighbors connected by links with large weights and less fre-
quently with those connected by links with small weights. Du et al. found that
cooperative behavior can be more facilitated when the link weights shared by
individuals are heterogeneous rather than homogeneous. Note that, in their
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model, interaction networks have two kinds of heterogeneity: heterogeneity of
the number of links and that of link weight. Note also that each link weight is
determined according to the number of links of individuals; that is, link weight
is a function of the degrees of the two individuals at either side of the focal
link. Therefore, in the Du et al. model it is difficult to ascertain which factor
enhances cooperation: heterogeneity of the number of links or heterogeneity of
link weight.
Additionally, Ma et al. [32] employed a two-dimensional square lattice with
individuals placed on its nodes. In their model, individuals play the PD game
with their immediate neighbors connected by links with heterogeneous link
weights. Ma et al. arranged three populations, where the link weights in
the population follow either power-law, exponential, or uniform distribution
patterns. They confirmed that a network with a power-law distribution of link
weights better facilitates the evolution of cooperation than one with link weights
conforming to one of the other two probability distributions.
Because a two-dimensional square lattice is used in their model, each indi-
vidual has the same number of links (i.e., four). Thus, their result clearly shows
that heterogeneity of link weight can bring about a cooperative state even with-
out heterogeneity of the number of links. However, in their model, the sum
of link weights of an individual, which we call the link-weight amount of the
individual, differs from those of others. That is, not only each of the links pos-
sessed by an individual can have a different weight, but the individual can also
have a different link-weight amount from other individuals. We call the former
intra-individual heterogeneity and the latter inter-individual heterogeneity.
When inter-individual heterogeneity exists, some individuals play the PD
game more frequently than others (link-weight amount is heterogeneous among
individuals). That is, there is heterogeneity of the interactions among individ-
uals. It has already been shown [13, 14, 15] that heterogeneity of interactions
among individuals due to heterogeneity of the number of links among individ-
uals and not to inter-individual heterogeneity can facilitate the evolution of
cooperation.
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Figure 1: Examples of a one-dimensional lattice with three kinds of heterogeneity: (a) inter-
individual heterogeneity, (b) heterogeneity of the number of links, and (c) intra-individual
heterogeneity. Thick and thin lines between individuals denote links with large and small
weights, respectively.
Fig. 1 shows three examples of a one-dimensional lattice having, respectively,
intra-individual heterogeneity, inter-individual heterogeneity, and heterogeneity
of the number of links. Fig. 1(a) shows an example of inter-individual hetero-
geneity, where individuals on the left-hand side have large link-weight amounts
and those on the right-hand side have small link-weight amounts. In this case,
individuals on the left-hand side interact more frequently with others than those
on the right-hand side; that is, there is heterogeneity of interactions between
individuals. Heterogeneity of the number of links is shown in Fig. 1(b), where
individuals on the left-hand side have a large number of links and thus more
opportunity to interact than those on the right-hand side. Both inter-individual
heterogeneity and heterogeneity of the number of links bring about a similar type
of heterogeneity of interactions among individuals in the sense that either can
cause link-weight amount heterogeneity. Finally, Fig. 1(c) shows an example
of intra-individual heterogeneity, where each individual has both a large-weight
link and a small-weight link, but all individuals have an equivalent link-weight
amount. That is, intra-individual heterogeneity does not involve the hetero-
geneity of the link-weight amount among individuals but involves the hetero-
geneity of the weight of links of each individual. Thus, it should be noted that
intra-individual heterogeneity and inter-individual heterogeneity are essentially
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different types of heterogeneity.
The literature [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,
48] has investigated the effect of heterogeneity on the evolution of cooperation
from variety of viewpoints 1. Especially, Du et al. [31] and Ma et al. [32] have
clearly shown, as mentioned in the above, that the existence of link-weight het-
erogeneity facilitates the evolution of cooperation. However, we cannot reject
the possibility that the evolution of cooperation in the models of Du et al. and
Ma et al. might be facilitated by the effect of link-weight amount heterogene-
ity, whose effect on the evolution of cooperation has already been confirmed by
Santos and Pacheco [13]. This is because the link-weight heterogeneity in their
models involves not only intra-individual heterogeneity but also inter-individual
heterogeneity. Whether heterogeneity of link weight without heterogeneity of
link-weight amount, intra-individual heterogeneity alone, can promote the evo-
lution of cooperation or not is the remaining question to be solved. Detailed
investigation of this question would enable us to understand the underlying
mechanism of the evolution of cooperation caused by the heterogeneity of inter-
actions among individuals.
To answer this question, we introduce the simplest possible model of a
weighted network, with intra-individual heterogeneity and without inter-individual
heterogeneity. First, we employ a weighted one-dimensional lattice as the sim-
plest network model and investigate the effect of link-weight heterogeneity on
the enhancement of cooperation. Second, we examine when and how such het-
erogeneous link weight gives rise to the evolution of cooperation; that is, we in-
vestigate the mechanism by which heterogeneity enables cooperation to evolve.
1For example, Cao et al. [35] focused on the dynamics (change over time) of the magnitude
of the link-weight heterogeneity. Chen and Perc [38] examined the effect of the heterogeneity
in incentives for rewarding individuals in the public goods game on promoting cooperation.
Szolnoki et al. [41], Perc and Szolnoki [42], and Santos et al. [43] examined diversity of individ-
uals. Perc [44] introduced the random variations to the payoff of individuals and invetigated
the effect of it on the evolution of cooperation. Brede [47] and Tanimoto [48] analyzed the
bias in game partner selection.
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Specifically, we identify the conditions under which link-weight heterogeneity
enables society to become cooperative, through analytical calculation and com-
puter simulation.
2. The model
In this study, we develop a model of a spatial evolutionary game with link-
weight heterogeneity based both on the PD cellular automaton model proposed
by Nowak and May [11, 12] and the weighted network model employed by Du
et al. [31, 33], Ma et al. [32], Buesser [34], and so on. We construct a lattice
network model in which each individual occupies one node and is connected to
his/her neighbors by links with heterogeneous weights. Each individual has two
links, one shared by the individual to his/her left and one to his/her right. We
assume periodic boundary conditions for the network we employ.
There are two types of heterogeneity of link weight in a network: (i) intra-
individual heterogeneity: the heterogeneity of link weight between the links of an
individual; that is, an individual can have a large-weight link with one neighbor
and a small-weight link with another; and (ii) inter-individual heterogeneity: the
heterogeneity of link weight between individuals; that is, an individual can have
many large-weight links whereas another can have many small-weight links. In
this research, we focus on the former type of heterogeneity to begin our investi-
gation on the effect of link-weight heterogeneity on the evolution of cooperation
using the simplest form of heterogeneity.
Because we consider a network with intra-individual heterogeneity only (i.e.,
without inter-individual heterogeneity), the sums of the link weights of all the
individuals are roughly equivalent. Let the weight of a link (large-weight link)
of an individual be w1 and the weight of the other link (small-weight link)
be w2 (w1 > w2 > 0). Because we assume that there is no inter-individual
heterogeneity (the sum of w1 and w2 is the same for all individuals) and that an
individual’s right (left) link is shared by the right (left) neighbor, all individuals
have a link with weight w1 and one with weight w2.
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Hereafter, we assume a large link weight to be w1 = 1.0 + w and a small
weight to be w2 = 1.0 − w to express w1 and w2 using only one parameter,
w ∈ [0, 1]. The larger the value of w, the more heterogeneous the link weight
becomes. When w = 0, link weight in the lattice network is completely homo-
geneous.
To investigate the evolution of cooperation in weighted networks, we consider
the situation where each individual i plays the PD game with his/her immediate
neighbors in a weighted lattice network as described above. We assume an
individual i has a strategy si ={C,D} that determines whether to cooperate
with or defect from all of his/her neighbors. That is, each individual can either
be a cooperator who always cooperates with all his/her opponents or a defector
who always defects. According to the literature [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 31, 32, 33, 35, 41, 42, 47], we rescale the game to be drawn using a single
parameter. For the PD game, we let T = b, R = 1, and P = S = 0 2 to rescale
the payoff matrix using one parameter b. This parameter represents the payoff
of a defector when exploiting a cooperator, and is constrained by the interval
1.0 < b < 2.0. In each generation, all pairs of connected individuals play the
PD game. After playing the game, each individual obtains the payoff multiplied
by the value of the weight of the link with his/her opponent. The weight of
the link between individuals i and j is defined as wij , and the payoff of an
individual i with strategy si, when playing with an individual j with strategy
sj , is represented as pisisj . The total payoff an individual i receives is expressed
as Πi =
∑
j∈Vi
pisisjwij , where Vi is the set of neighbors of individual i. In the
first generation, each individual’s strategy, which is either to cooperate or to
defect, is randomly determined with a 50 percent probability. We define the
score of each individual in a generation as the sum of the payoffs received from
2As Nowak and May [11] noted, simulation results are typically not affected by whether
the payoff matrix involves P = S or P > S, thus, we assume P = S in our study. This
assumption enables the payoff matrix to be expressed and controlled only by one parameter
b.
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all the games with his/her neighbors.
After all individuals have played the PD game with all their neighbors, each
individual imitates the strategy of the individual with the maximum score
among all his/her neighbors including him/herself. An individual does not
change his/her strategy if he/she is one of those with the maximum score. If an
individual has more than one neighbor, excluding him/herself, with the max-
imum score, he/she chooses one of them randomly. Individuals update their
strategies simultaneously, after which one generation is completed.
For the evolutionary simulation, we set the network size N=10,000 and set
b (the temptation to defect from a cooperator) such that b ∈ (1.0, 2.0) in steps
of 0.01. We assume that w ∈ [0, 1.0] in steps of 0.01, and therefore, 1.0 + w
denotes a large weight (strong link) and 1.0− w corresponds to a small weight
(weak link).
3. Simulation results and discussion
To examine how heterogeneity of link weight affects the evolution of cooper-
ation, we analyzed how the degree of link-weight heterogeneity, w, affected the
resulting frequency of cooperation in the population. The frequency of coopera-
tion in each generation was calculated as the ratio of the number of cooperators
to the total population size. We defined the frequency for a simulation run
as the average of the frequency of cooperation over 100 generations after the
2,000th generation. We adopted this definition because, although we wished to
estimate the frequency at the convergent state, we found that this state some-
times did not converge to a fixed state but went to a periodic state. (We checked
that the frequency of cooperation could reach a steady or periodic state within
2,000 generations.) We performed 100 runs of the computer simulation for each
parameter setting and calculated the average of the frequency of cooperation
for all the runs 3, which hereafter, we refer to as the frequency of cooperation.
3For each parameter setting, all individuals followed the payoff matrix in which parameter
b had an identical value and the value of link-weight parameter w was the same for all links.
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3.1. Overview of the effect of link-weight heterogeneity on the evolution of co-
operation
Figs. 2(a) and (b) illustrate the simulation results for the PD game on a
weighted one-dimensional lattice and show the frequency of cooperation for dif-
ferent values of link-weight heterogeneity, w. As shown in these figures, changes
in the frequency of cooperation with an increase in w differ in the case of a small
b = 1.2 (Fig. 2(a)) and that of a large b = 1.8 (Fig. 2(b)).
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Figure 2: Frequency of cooperation for different values of link-weight heterogeneity, w, in a
weighted one-dimensional lattice: (a) case with a small b (b=1.2) and (b) case with a large
b (b=1.8). The horizontal and vertical axes represent the degree of w, which reflects the
magnitude of the heterogeneity of link weight and frequency of cooperation, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 2(a), the frequency of cooperation when the link weight is
heterogeneous (w > 0) is always greater than that in the case of homogeneous
weight (w = 0). Fig. 2(b) shows that the frequency of cooperation when the
link weight is heterogeneous is smaller than that in the case of homogeneous
weight. If the value of w increases further, however, the magnitude of coop-
erative behavior in the case of heterogeneous weight is greatly enhanced and
exceeds that in the case of homogeneous weight. In both cases (a) and (b), the
cooperation frequency reaches the maximum at some value of w(> 0) (when
there is some degree of link-weight heterogeneity). Both of these figures show
that the frequency of cooperation does not change with an increase in w until w
reaches a certain threshold; that is, the change in the frequency is not gradual,
but stepwise with an increase in w. As shown in Figs. 2(a) and (b), there are two
thresholds for w, Threshold A and Threshold B, at which the value of coopera-
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tion frequency jumps up or down. These thresholds are w = (b− 1.0)/(b+ 1.0)
and w = 2.0/b− 1.0, the derivations of which are provided later.
We have shown that moderate level of link-weight heterogeneity (intra-
individual heterogeneity) can enhance cooperation and that there are some
thresholds in w (a parameter that represents the degree of heterogeneity) at
which the cooperation frequency changes in a stepwise manner. We checked
that these results are robust against both the difference of the network size and
the existence of the decision error (See Appendix A for detail).
3.2. Analysis of small population case — When and how does the heterogeneity
of link weight facilitate cooperation?
In the following, we explore why the heterogeneity of link weight brings about
the evolution of cooperation and why the frequency of cooperation changes in
a stepwise manner with an increase in link-weight heterogeneity w. To answer
these questions, we consider a much simpler model composed of six individu-
als only, and investigate in detail how the heterogeneity of link weight affects
evolutionary dynamics.
In the case of a lattice network with six individuals, possible configurations
of the strategies chosen by the six individuals are: “−C≡C−C≡C−C≡C−,”
“−C≡C−C≡C−C≡D−,” “−C≡C−C≡C−D≡C−,” ..., “−D≡D−D≡D−D≡D−,”
where “C” and “D” denote cooperator and defector, respectively, “≡” represents
a link with a large weight 1.0+w, and “−” indicates a link with a small weight
1.0− w. The total number of possible configurations is 26=64.
Starting with each of the 64 initial configurations, we investigated how the
configuration changed over time resulting from updates of the six individu-
als’ strategies and identified the attractors of the evolutionary dynamics of the
strategy configurations over generations, which were either steady states or pe-
riodic cycles. Next, we estimated the cooperation frequency in the attractor of
evolutionary dynamics by taking an average of the data derived from the last
100 generations. In each of the 64 case studies, we focused on initial strategy
configurations that reached different cooperative states depending on the value
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of link-weight heterogeneity w. Next, we classified these configurations into
three types: Type (i): configurations that lead to a higher cooperation level
when w > 0 than that with a homogeneous link weight (w = 0). Type (ii):
configurations that lead to a lower cooperation level when w > 0. Type (iii):
configurations leading to the same level of cooperation. (See Appendix B for
the classification of the initial strategy configurations into these three types.)
Because we are interested in cases where the heterogeneity of link weight has
an effect on the evolution of cooperation, in the following, we focus on strategy
configurations of the first and second types.
There are six strategy configurations that belong to Type (i) (see Appendix
B), which shows that higher heterogeneity (large w) causes an increase in coop-
eration frequency. These six configurations have a common pattern, as shown
in Figs. 3(a) and (b). Similarly, there are three strategy configurations that be-
long to Type (ii), where the magnitude of cooperation frequency decreases with
higher heterogeneity. These three configurations have a common configuration
pattern as shown in Fig. 4.
First, we consider the evolutionary dynamics, starting from the strategy con-
figuration pattern in Figs. 3(a) and (b). Here, we focus on the third individual
from the left in each of both figures, who we simply call the focal individual.
When starting from the strategy configuration pattern shown in these figures,
the focal individual chooses cooperation in the next step for a large w. For
a small w, however, the focal individual does not change his/her strategy and
keeps the strategy of defection. In short, this configuration pattern enables the
spread of cooperation if heterogeneity of link weight exists. We now investigate
in detail why this spread of cooperation occurs.
Figs. 3(a) and (b) show the strategy configuration patterns for Type (i),
where the heterogeneous link weight (w > 0) achieves a higher cooperation fre-
quency than the homogeneous one (w = 0). Of the 64 strategy configurations,
there are six configurations where greater link-weight heterogeneity enables a
higher cooperation level: “−C≡C−D≡D−C≡C−,” “−D≡D−C≡C−C≡C−,”
“−C≡C−C≡C−D≡D−,” “−C≡C−D≡D−D≡D−,” “−D≡D−D≡D−C≡C−,”
12
Figure 3: Strategy configuration patterns for type (i), where heterogeneous link weight (w > 0)
achieves higher cooperation frequency than the homogeneous one (w = 0). “C” and “D”
denote cooperator and defector, respectively, “≡” represents a large-weight link, and “−”
indicates a small-weight link. Whether the strategy of the focal individual changes from
defection to cooperation depends on the value of link-weight heterogeneity w. The change
in strategy of the focal individual after one generation (interactions and strategy updates) is
indicated by the arrow in the lower part of each figure.
and “−D≡D−C≡C−D≡D−.” Considering the periodic boundary condition,
the first three configurations are equivalent to “−C≡C−D≡D−C≡C−,” which
is shown at the top of Fig. 3(a). Similarly, the latter three configurations are
equivalent to “−C≡C−D≡D−D≡D−,” which is shown at the top of Fig. 3(b).
We define two cooperators connected by a large-weight link as “C≡C cluster,”
two defectors connected by a large-weight link as “D≡D cluster,” and one coop-
erator and one defector connected strongly as “C≡D cluster” or “D≡C cluster.”
When “C≡C cluster,” “D≡D cluster,” and “C≡C or D≡D cluster” are adjacent
as shown in Figs. 3(a) and (b), there is the possibility that the focal individual
(the third individual) updates his/her strategy from defection to cooperation
depending on the value of w (link-weight heterogeneity). We call this configu-
ration pattern the spread pattern strategy configuration.
Given that there exists a spread pattern strategy configuration, we investigate
the actual conditions under which the focal individual (the third individual)
updates his/her strategy from defection to cooperation. Because each individual
obtains the payoff of the PD gamemultiplied by the value of the weight of the link
with his/her opponent and each individual’s score is the sum of all the payoffs
obtained by playing PD games with his/her neighbors, the score of the third
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individual is b(1.0 − w). The fourth individual obtains a score of b(1.0 − w) if
the fifth individual is a cooperator (see Fig. 3(a)), else 0 if the fifth is a defector
(see Fig. 3(b)). Thus, in either case, the score of the focal individual (the third
individual) is greater than or equal to that of the fourth individual. Because
the focal individual is assumed to imitate the strategy of the individual with the
maximum score, it is sufficient for the focal individual to compare his/her score
with that of the second individual to ascertain whose strategy to imitate. The
focal individual imitates the second individual’s strategy and changes his/her
strategy from defection to cooperation only if the second individual’s score is
higher than the focal individual’s own score. Because the score of the focal
individual is b(1.0−w) and that of the second individual is 1.0+w, the condition
under which the focal individual imitates the strategy of the second individual
is 1.0 + w > b(1.0− w); that is, w > (b− 1.0)/(b+ 1.0) for a given b.
Thus, if the population involves the spread pattern strategy configuration
composed of three adjoining clusters, namely, “C≡C cluster,” “D≡D cluster,”
and “C≡C or D≡D cluster,” whether the focal individual changes his/her strat-
egy from defection to cooperation depends on the link-weight heterogeneity;
that is, he/she becomes a cooperator if the link weight satisfies the condition
w > (b− 1.0)/(b+1.0). We refer to the inequality of w mentioned above as the
condition for the spread of cooperation. To summarize, if this condition is sat-
isfied in the spread pattern strategy configuration, cooperative behavior spreads
from the second to the third individual.
Next, we look at the evolutionary dynamics starting from the strategy con-
figuration pattern in Fig. 4. As in the case of Figs. 3(a) and (b), we focus on
the third individual from the left in this figure and call him/her the focal indi-
vidual. When starting from the strategy configuration pattern shown in Fig. 4,
the focal individual chooses defection in the next step for sufficiently large val-
ues of w. For a small w, however, the focal individual does not change his/her
strategy and retains a cooperative state. In short, this configuration pattern en-
ables maintenance of cooperation when the heterogeneity is not so large. In the
following, we investigate in detail why this maintenance of cooperation occurs.
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Figure 4: Strategy configuration pattern for type (ii), where heterogeneous link weight (w > 0)
reduces cooperation frequency more than homogeneous link weight (w = 0). Here, “C” and
“D” denote cooperator and defector, respectively, “≡” represents a large-weight link, and
“−” indicates a small-weight link. Whether the focal individual changes his/her strategy
from cooperation to defection is dependent on the value of link-weight heterogeneity w. A
change in the strategy of the focal individual after one generation (including interactions and
strategy updates) is depicted by the arrow in the lower part of the figure.
Fig. 4 shows the strategy configuration pattern in the case of Type (ii), where
homogeneous link weight (w = 0) achieves higher cooperation frequency than
heterogeneous weight (w > 0). Of the 64 strategy configurations, there are
three configurations where a small heterogeneity promotes further cooperation:
“−C≡C−C≡D−D≡C−,” “−C≡D−D≡C−C≡C−,” and “−D≡C−C≡C−C≡D−.”
Considering the periodic boundary condition, these configurations are equiva-
lent to “−C≡C−C≡D−D≡C−,” as shown at the top of Fig. 4. When “C≡C
cluster,” “C≡D cluster,” and “D≡C cluster” are adjacent, as shown in this fig-
ure, there is a possibility that the focal individual (third individual) updates
his/her strategy from cooperation to defection depending on the value of w
(link-weight heterogeneity). We call this configuration pattern the maintenance
pattern strategy configuration.
Given that there exists a maintenance pattern strategy configuration, we
investigate the condition under which the focal individual (third individual)
does not update his/her strategy from cooperation to defection and retains the
strategy of cooperation. In this case, the focal individual (third individual) has
a score of 1.0 − w, the second has a score of 2.0, and the fourth has a score
of b(1.0 + w). So the focal individual does not imitate the fourth individual’s
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strategy (defection) but imitates the second individual’s strategy (cooperation),
only if 2.0 > b(1.0 + w); that is, w < 2.0/b− 1.0 for a given b.
Therefore, if the population is subject to a maintenance pattern strategy con-
figuration composed of three adjoining clusters, namely, “C≡C cluster,” “C≡D
cluster,” and “D≡C cluster,” whether the focal individual can refrain from
changing his/her strategy from cooperation to defection depends on link-weight
heterogeneity; that is, he/she remains a cooperator if the heterogeneity w sat-
isfies the condition w < 2.0/b − 1.0. We call the inequality of w given above
the condition for maintenance of cooperation. If this condition is satisfied in the
maintenance pattern strategy configuration, defective behavior does not spread
from the fourth to the third individual. Otherwise, defection spreads.
Thus far, we have derived the condition for the spread of cooperation w >
(b−1.0)/(b+1.0)4 and that for the maintenance of cooperation w < 2.0/b−1.0 for
one individual in a small population. These obtained conditions are illustrated
in Fig. 5.
The parameter space for the temptation payoff, b, and link-weight hetero-
geneity, w, is divided into four regions, namely, region I, where both conditions
are satisfied, region II, where only the spread condition is satisfied, region III
where only the maintenance condition is satisfied, and region IV where neither
condition is satisfied.
3.3. Simulation analysis on a large population
The two conditions identified in the previous subsection are based on the
analysis of a small population (six nodes); nevertheless, whether these two con-
4In fact, the condition w > (b − 1.0)/(b + 1.0) is not only the spread condition of coop-
eration but also is the maintenance condition, under which cooperator avoids from changing
his/her strategy to defection; that is, cooperation can be maintained. However, this fact does
not change our results in which the intermediate level of the magnitude of heterogeneity can
enhance cooperation and that heterogeneity has several thresholds at which cooperation fre-
quency changes in a stepwise manner. Thus, we omit the fact that w > (b − 1.0)/(b + 1.0)
involves both spread and maintenance conditions in this paper.
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Figure 5: Two conditions under which link-weight heterogeneity enables the
spread/maintenance of cooperation in a small population. These conditions are deter-
mined and illustrated here using a combination of link-weight heterogeneity w and payoff b.
The horizontal and vertical axes represent the payoff b and the value of w.
ditions can control the spread/maintenance of the frequency of cooperation in a
large population as well, remains to be seen. As mentioned, Figs. 2(a) and (b)
depict the simulation results for a large (10,000 node) one-dimensional lattice
showing how link-weight heterogeneity w affects the frequency of cooperation.
By comparing Figs. 2(a) and (b) with Fig. 5, we can see whether the condition
for the spread of cooperation w > (b − 1.0)/(b + 1.0) and that for the main-
tenance of cooperation w < 2.0/b− 1.0 identified in the small population, also
hold in a large population.
For example, when b = 1.2, the phase shifts in Fig. 5 through regions III
(maintenance condition holds), I (both conditions hold), and II (spread condi-
tion holds), as parameter w increases. After an increase in w, it will be on the
boundary between regions III and I where w = (b − 1.0)/(b + 1.0) holds. As
mentioned, in Fig. 2(a), if w has a value satisfying w = (b−1.0)/(b+1.0), w is at
Threshold A, at which point the cooperation frequency increases in a stepwise
manner. If the value of w satisfies (b− 1.0)/(b+1.0) < w < 2.0/b− 1.0, cooper-
ation frequency is at its highest value in Fig. 2(a), and when b = 1.2, (w, b) is in
region I in Fig. 5. Thereafter, if the value of w is equal to w = 2.0/b− 1.0, w is
at Threshold B at which point the cooperation frequency starts to decrease in
a stepwise manner in Fig. 2(a), and (w, b) is located at the boundary between
regions I and II in Fig. 5. Similarly, also in the case where b = 1.8, the phase
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shifts in Fig. 5 through regions as an increase in the value of w correspond to
the changes in the cooperation frequency seen in Fig. 2(b).
We have found that the two conditions identified in the small group can
explain the effect of link-weight heterogeneity on the level of cooperation fre-
quency in a large population. However, so far we have confirmed this only in
the cases with b = 1.2 and b = 1.8. Next, we examine the possibility of an
application of the two obtained conditions for w to an increase or decrease in
the cooperation frequency in a stepwise manner for several thresholds of w over
the whole parameter range of b ∈ (1.0, 2.0) (in steps of 0.01).
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Figure 6: Simulation results for the PD game showing the relationship between the frequency
of cooperation and b − w parameter combination. The horizontal and vertical axes denote
temptation payoff b and link-weight heterogeneity w. Here, color coding represents the magni-
tude of the frequency of cooperation, as shown on the sidebar. We denote the region with the
highest cooperation frequency (red) as region I’, that with the second highest frequency (or-
ange) as region II’, that with the third highest (green) as region III’, and the lowest frequency
region (blue) as region IV’.
Fig. 6 illustrates the frequency of cooperation for different values of the
combination of b and w. If the combination of b and w denotes a point that is
located in region I (both conditions hold) in Fig. 5, the same point is placed in
region I’ in Fig. 6, at which point the cooperation frequency has its highest value.
In addition, if the combination of b and w denotes a point that is located in
18
region II (spread condition holds) in Fig. 5, the same point is placed in region II’
in Fig. 6 and the magnitude of the cooperation frequency is the second highest.
It is observed that the two lines w = (b − 1.0)/(b + 1.0) and w = 2.0/b − 1.0
in Fig. 5 coincide with the lines dividing the parameter space into four regions
(region I’, II’, III”, and IV’) in Fig. 6. This coincidence implies that the two
conditions for link-weight heterogeneity w identified in the small population also
hold for the spread/maintenance of cooperation in the large population across
the entire parameter range of b.
4. Conclusion
Much research has been conducted to analyze the factors that promote the
evolution of cooperation in natural and social systems. Recently, several re-
searchers [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48] have
examined the effect of heterogeneity on the evolution of cooperation. Especially,
Du et al. [31] and Ma et al. [32] have clarified that link-weight heterogeneity can
facilitate cooperation. However, they investigated heterogeneity of interactions
among individuals, which includes both intra-individual heterogeneity and inter-
individual heterogeneity, to the best of our knowledge. Inter-individual hetero-
geneity leads to heterogeneity of the link-weight amount, which causes hetero-
geneous interactions similar to those caused by the heterogeneity of the number
of links, and the effect of the heterogeneity of the number of links on the pro-
motion of cooperation has already been established in the literature [13, 14, 15].
Therefore, the effect of link-weight heterogeneity on the evolution of coopera-
tion may be given only by inter-individual heterogeneity whose effect is similar
to that of the heterogeneity of the number of links. To investigate whether link-
weight heterogeneity within each individual alone can promote cooperation, it is
necessary to use a model with intra-individual heterogeneity and without inter-
individual heterogeneity. Additionally, it has not been fully resolved when and
how promotion of cooperation based on the heterogeneity of link weight takes
place.
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To address these issues, we constructed a simple model of one-dimensional
lattice with heterogeneous link weight, on which individuals play the evolution-
ary PD game. We assumed that the sum of the link weights of each individual
was equal, to remove the effect of inter-individual heterogeneity on the promo-
tion of cooperation, thereby focusing only on intra-individual heterogeneity.
By performing calculations and analyses, we obtained the following two re-
sults. First, we clarified that the moderate magnitude of intra-individual het-
erogeneity of link weight can facilitate cooperation and that there are some
thresholds in the range of the heterogeneity level, at which the change in the
cooperation frequency occurs in a stepwise manner. This result suggests that,
even when there is no heterogeneity of link-weight amount that causes a sim-
ilar effect to that of heterogeneity of the number of links as in Santos and
Pacheco [13], heterogeneous link weight within each individual alone can pro-
mote cooperation. Second, we found the key mechanisms whereby link-weight
heterogeneity facilitates the evolution of cooperation, the mechanisms for the
spread and maintenance of cooperation. We also derived corresponding condi-
tions for the both mechanisms to work through evolutionary dynamics, which
have not been clarified before.
Because the simulation model used is very simple, it may appear to be some-
what unrealistic. However, this simplicity enabled us to examine the effect of
heterogeneous link weight (intra-individual heterogeneity) and the aforemen-
tioned mechanisms. We believe that our discovery of these mechanisms can
form the basis of future researches on link-weight heterogeneity. It would be
interesting to investigate the effect of heterogeneity of link weight on the evo-
lution of cooperation and its mechanism using a mathematical model with a
more realistic assumption. For example, to extend the network structure from
a one-dimensional lattice to a two-dimensional one 5, or so-called complex net-
works such as small-world and scale-free networks, would be attractive matter
to be worked on as a future work. Another interesting avenue for future research
5Preliminary analyses on a two-dimensional lattice are given in Appendix C.
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would be to identify the mechanisms by which link-weight heterogeneity that
includes both intra-individual heterogeneity and inter-individual heterogeneity,
such as link-weight heterogeneity in the real world, promotes cooperation. Al-
though we found in this paper the mechanism by which intra-individual het-
erogeneity alone can facilitate cooperation, there may be a specific mechanism
for the evolution of cooperation caused by the interplay between intra- and
inter-individual heterogeneities.
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Appendix A. Investigation of the robustness of the results
In section 3.1, we described that moderate level of link-weight heterogeneity
(intra-individual heterogeneity) can promote more cooperation than in the case
where link-weight is homogeneous. Moreover, there are some thresholds in w
(a parameter that represents the degree of heterogeneity) at which the stepwise
changes of cooperation frequency occur. To confirm the robustness of these
results, we examined whether the difference of the network size and the existence
of the decision error affect the evolution of cooperation.
Appendix A.1. Robustness of the results against the system size
To check the robustness of these results for variations in system size, we
employed six one-dimensional lattice networks composed of 100, 500, 1,000,
5,000, and 10,000 individuals. By performing the computer simulation provided
in section 2, we calculated the cooperation frequency and compared it with that
derived from the model with the network size of 10,000 individuals.
Fig. A.1 shows the cooperation frequency for different values of link-weight
heterogeneity w. Figs. A.1(a)-1 to (e)-1 illustrate the simulation results for
different system sizes when b, temptation to defect, is small (b=1.2). Similarly,
Figs. A.1(a)-2 to (e)-2 illustrate the simulation results when b is large (b=1.8).
From these figures, we can see that the results are not different with a vari-
ation in system size, as in the following. (i) We observe that homogeneous
link-weight heterogeneity (w=0) does not always yield the highest cooperation
level in an entire range of w. That is, the moderate magnitude of heterogeneity
achieves more cooperation than the case in which the link weight is homoge-
neous. (ii) We observe that there are some thresholds in w at which discon-
tinuous changes of the cooperation frequency occur. These tendencies can be
seen in the aforementioned six one-dimensional lattice networks. Therefore, we
believe that the results obtained are robust with regard to differences in the
system size.
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Figure A.1: Frequency of cooperation for different values of link-weight heterogeneity, w, in
a weighted one-dimensional lattice: (a)-1 and (a)-2 for size 100, (b)-1 and (b)-2 for size 500,
(c)-1 and (c)-2 for size 1,000, (d)-1 and (d)-2 for size 5,000, and (e)-1 and (e)-2 for size 10,000.
(a) to (e) -1 represent the results with a small b (b=1.2), and (a) to (e) -2 show the results with
a large b (b=1.8).The horizontal axis represents the degree of w, which reflects the magnitude
of link-weight heterogeneity. The vertical axis indicates the cooperation frequency.
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Appendix A.2. Robustness of the results against the mutation/error
To check the robustness of the results against the mutation/error, we built
a model that incorporates the possibility of a decision-making error. We per-
formed a computer simulation in which each individual made a mistake in the
process of decision-making for a strategy update with probability 0.02, 0.05,
0.08, and 0.1, and we compared the results with that of the case without a
decision-making error.
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Figure A.2: Frequency of cooperation for different values of link-weight heterogeneity, w, in a
weighted one-dimensional lattice: (a) error rate 0.02, (b) error rate 0.05, (c) error rate 0.08,
and (d) error rate 0.1. (a) to (e) -1 represent the results with a small b (b=1.2), and (a) to
(e) -2 show the results with a large b (b=1.8). The horizontal axis represents the degree of
w, which reflects the magnitude of link-weight heterogeneity. The vertical axis indicates the
cooperation frequency.
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Fig. A.2 shows the cooperation frequency for different values of link-weight
heterogeneity w. Figs. A.2(a)-1 to (e)-1 illustrate the simulation results for
different error rates when b, the temptation to defect from a cooperator, is
small (b=1.2). Similarly, Figs. A.2(a)-2 to (e)-2 illustrate the simulation results
when b is large (b=1.8).
From these figures, we can see that the results are not different regardless of
the error rate, as in the following. (i) We observe that homogeneous link-weight
heterogeneity (w=0) does not always yield the highest cooperation level in an
entire range of w. That is, the moderate magnitude of heterogeneity achieves
more cooperation than the case in which the link weight is homogeneous. (ii)
We observe that there are some thresholds in w at which discontinuous changes
of the cooperation frequency occur. These tendencies can be seen in the afore-
mentioned six one-dimensional lattice networks. Although an error may cause
the birth of a defective individual, it is likely that strategy configuration and
condition for the spread or maintenance of cooperation can prevent the pene-
tration of defection in the population. Thus, we confirmed that our results hold
true even when there is an error in the decision making of the strategy update
of each individual.
Appendix B. Classification of strategy configurations
In this appendix, we show the classification of the initial strategy configura-
tions for a convergent state of cooperation frequency in a small one-dimensional
lattice consisting of six individuals. Of the 26=64 initial strategy configurations,
we focus on those configurations that, through evolution, reach different coop-
erative states depending on whether the link weight is heterogeneous (w > 0) or
homogeneous (w = 0) as a result of the evolution of strategies. As mentioned
in Section 3.2, the initial strategy configurations are classified into the follow-
ing three types: Type (i) in which heterogeneous link weight (w > 0) leads to
higher cooperation frequency than the homogeneous one (w = 0); Type (ii) in
which heterogeneous weight suppresses cooperation; and Type (iii) where both
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heterogeneous and homogeneous link weights lead to the same magnitude of
cooperation. The initial strategy configuration types are listed in Table B.16.
Appendix C. Two-dimensional lattice: Results and brief analysis
Here we investigate the effect of link-weight heterogeneity on the evolution of
cooperation on a two-dimensional lattice network. We calculate the cooperation
frequency and describe the brief analysis of the mechanism that heterogeneity
promotes cooperation. In our model, individuals are placed on the nodes of
a two-dimensional lattice and are assumed to interact with their immediate
neighbors. We assume the periodic boundary condition for the network. Each
of them is surrounded by upper, lower, left, and right immediate neighbors and
has two links with weight w1 = 1.0+w and two with weight w2 = 1.0−w. Thus
we can control a value of link weight only by one parameter w and link-weight
amount of each individual can be 4.0 regardless of the value of w.
Under these assumptions, there can be infinitely many kinds of weighted
two-dimensional lattices. We show examples of these in Fig. C.1. As shown in
Fig. C.1(a), (b), and (c), when a weighted lattice is filled with non-overlapping
rectangles composed of large-weight links, each individual (node) is either a
vertex (corner) of the rectangle or on a side of the rectangle. Observation of
these figures enables us to understand easily that there can be infinitely many
link-weight distribution patterns of a two dimensional lattice occupied by such
examples. However, Fig. C.1(d), (e), (f), (g), and (h) shows examples filled with
non-overlapping closed lines that form non-rectangular shapes. Our analysis of
the evolution of cooperation in a two-dimensional lattice focused on the cases
6Six strategy configurations are classified as both Type (i) and (ii), where, whether the
heterogeneous link weight (w > 0) achieves a higher cooperation frequency through evolution
than the homogeneous weight (w = 0) depends on the value of b. Our purpose was to identify
the mechanisms whereby link-weight heterogeneity enhances cooperation and to derive the
conditions for the mechanisms to work. Therefore, we investigated the strategy configurations
classified only as Type (i) or (ii).
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Initial strategy configuration Classification type
−C≡C−D≡D−C≡C−, −D≡D−C≡C−C≡C−, Type (i): Heterogeneous link
−C≡C−C≡C−D≡D−, −C≡C−D≡D−D≡D−, weight (w > 0) promotes
−D≡D−D≡D−C≡C−, −D≡D−C≡C−D≡D− further cooperation
−C≡C−C≡D−D≡C−, −C≡D−D≡C−C≡C−, Type (ii): Homogeneous link
−D≡C−C≡C−C≡D− weight (w = 0) promotes
further cooperation
−C≡C−C≡C−C≡C−, −C≡C−C≡D−C≡D−, Type (iii): Heterogeneous
−C≡C−D≡C−D≡C−, −C≡C−D≡C−C≡D−, weight (w > 0) and
−C≡D−C≡C−D≡C−, −C≡D−C≡D−C≡C−, homogeneous weight
−C≡D−C≡D−D≡C−, −C≡D−C≡C−C≡D−, (w = 0) achieve the
−C≡D−C≡D−C≡D−, −C≡D−C≡D−D≡D−, same level of cooperation
−C≡D−D≡C−D≡C−, −C≡D−D≡D−D≡C−,
−C≡D−D≡C−C≡D−, −C≡D−D≡C−D≡D−,
−C≡D−D≡D−C≡D−, −C≡D−D≡D−D≡D−,
−D≡C−C≡C−D≡C−, −D≡C−C≡D−C≡C−,
−D≡C−C≡D−C≡D−, −D≡C−C≡D−D≡C−,
−D≡C−C≡D−D≡D−, −D≡C−D≡C−C≡C−,
−D≡C−D≡C−D≡C−, −D≡C−D≡C−C≡D−,
−D≡C−D≡C−D≡D−, −D≡C−D≡D−C≡D−,
−D≡C−D≡D−D≡C−, −D≡C−D≡D−D≡D−,
−D≡D−C≡D−C≡D−, −D≡D−C≡D−D≡C−,
−D≡D−C≡D−D≡D−, −D≡D−D≡C−D≡C−,
−D≡D−D≡D−D≡C−, −D≡D−D≡C−C≡D−,
−D≡D−D≡C−D≡D−, −D≡D−D≡D−C≡D−,
−D≡D−D≡D−D≡D−
Table B.1: List of initial strategy configurations and classification thereof into three types.
The first row represents the initial strategy configurations; the second row shows the three
classifications of the configurations in which greater link-weight heterogeneity w promotes
more cooperation, higher w reduces cooperation frequency, and different values of w do not
have any effect on the magnitude of the cooperation level, respectively. In the table, “C”
and “D” denote cooperator and defector, respectively, while “≡” indicates a link with a large
weight, and “−” means a link with a small weight.
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Figure C.1: Examples of link weight distribution patterns in a two-dimensional lattice without
inter-individual heterogeneity and where each individual has two links with a large weight
(denoted by thick lines) and two links with a small weight (denoted by thin lines). Here, (a),
(b), and (c) show weighted lattice networks filled with non-overlapping rectangles composed of
large-weight links, while (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h) show those filled with non-overlapping closed
lines forming non-rectangular shapes. Because the network is assumed to satisfy periodic
boundary conditions, the individuals marked with stars on the right and left sides of (e) are
connected with one another. Similarly, the individuals marked with triangles at the top and
bottom are connected with one another.
in Fig. C.1(g) and (h). We call the former Pattern A and the latter Pattern B
in this paper.
Figs. C.2(a) and (b) give the simulation results for the PD game on a
weighted two-dimensional lattice. These graphs show the frequency of coop-
eration for different values of link-weight heterogeneity w. Fig. C.2(a) shows
the simulation results when the population network follows pattern A, while
Fig. C.2(b) shows the same for pattern B, both of which set b = 1.2.
Contrary to the case of a one-dimensional lattice, it may be difficult to state
that large heterogeneity of link weight promotes further cooperation. How-
ever, as seen in Fig. C.2(a) and (b), link-weight heterogeneity w has a certain
heterogeneous value, which enhances further cooperation than in the case of
homogeneous weight. As in the case of a one-dimensional lattice, we observe
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Figure C.2: Frequency of cooperation for different values of link-weight heterogeneity w ob-
tained through simulations of the PD game on a weighted two-dimensional lattice. The
horizontal and vertical axes denote the degree of link-weight heterogeneity w and coopera-
tion frequency, respectively: (a) results for a pattern A network structure, and (b) results for
pattern B. Both experiments used b = 1.2.
that cooperation frequency changes in a stepwise manner with an increase in
link-weight heterogeneity w.
In a two-dimensional lattice, the number of interactions of each individ-
ual is twice that in the case of a one-dimensional lattice, so there may be a
great number of conditions under which a difference in the degree of link-weight
heterogeneity yields a different level of cooperation frequency. The vast num-
ber of thresholds makes it difficult to determine whether cooperation frequency
changes in a stepwise manner with a change in the value of link-weight hetero-
geneity w. However, as shown in Fig. C.2(a) and (b), and the enlarged figure in
the top right corner of Fig. C.2(b), it is highly likely that in the two-dimensional
lattice, the cooperation frequency changes, as in the one-dimensional lattice, in
a stepwise manner at the threshold values for link-weight heterogeneity w. Al-
though we have not yet identified all the threshold values of w at which the
frequency of cooperation changes in a stepwise manner for a given value of
b, we can present an example of the condition for the spread of cooperation,
w > 3.0(b− 1.0)/(b+ 1.0).
To perform the similar analisys to that in the case of a one-dimensional
lattice, we use a with 5×5 sized small lattice and focus on the dynamics of the
strategy of one individual. We show an example of the strategy configuration
patterns in a two-dimensional lattice with Pattern A in Fig. C.3.
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Figure C.3: Example of the strategy configuration patterns in a two-dimensional lattice with
Pattern A. We focus on Individual A as the focal individual and on Individuals B, C, D,
and E who are neighbors of Individual A. In this figure, “C” and “D” denote cooperator and
defector, respectively, and “X” represents an individual with an arbitrary strategy, “C” or
“D”. Note that the strategies of individuals “X” do not affect the payoffs of Individual A and
Individual B.
We focus on Individual A as the focal individual and on his/her strategy
update from defection to cooperation. Moreover, we focus on Individuals B, C,
D, and E, neighbors of Individual A. If the evolutionary dynamics starts from
the strategy configurations in this figure, Individual A decides to cooperate in
the next step and spreads the cooperative state if the link-weight heterogeneity
satisfies the inequality given later. We explain in detail why this spread of
cooperation occurs.
After playing the PD game, Individual A gets the score of b(3.0 − w), and
similarly the scores of Individuals B, C, D, and E are w+3.0, b(1.0+w), 1.0−w,
and 1.0+w, respectively. Individual A imitates the strategy of Individual B and
changes his/her strategy from defection to cooperation (spread of cooperation) if
the score of Individual B is higher than that of Individual A. Thus, the condition
under which Individual A imitates the strategy of Individual B is b(3.0− w) <
w + 3.0; that is, w > 3.0(b− 1.0)/(b+ 1.0) for a given b.
As already mentioned, we observed a stepwise change of the cooperation
frequency when w is placed at the threshold 3.0(b− 1.0)/(b+1.0). In addition,
we confirmed that the threshold 3.0(b − 1.0)/(b + 1.0) is one of the conditions
for w to achieve the spread of cooperation. Because it is difficult to find all the
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spread/maintenance pattern strategy configurations that reach different cooper-
ative states depending on the value of link-weight heterogeneity w and to derive
all the conditions for the spread/maintenance of cooperation, discovery of these
for a two-dimensional lattice is left for future work.
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